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LAWS OF CONCEPTION: A QUEER GENEALOGY OF CANADA’S 
ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT 
Stu Marvel* 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
This symposium on reproductive justice is both welcome and timely. 
My work has long been interested in how law and policy around assisted 
reproductive technology (“ART”) impact the lives, bodies, families, and 
communities of marginalized peoples, and, in particular, the lives of 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans and queer (“LGBTQ”) people.1 
Questions of access to reproductive technology, materials, and labor are 
obviously critical for LGBTQ families seeking to have genetically-related 
children, even as the language of fertility assistance for queer people has 
rested uneasily within a reproductive rights model.2 The framework of 
reproductive justice may thus offer a helpful mode through which to 
explore the structural conditions that produce and foreclose different forms 
of family, and the reproductive lives which may be lived (or not) under the 
institutional conditions presently set by law and medicine in North 
America.3 
 
∗ Lecturer in Law, University of Leeds. I would like to thank the student organizers of this symposium 
and journal volume on reproductive justice, and in particular Helen Sayers, Gisselle Perez, Gabriel 
Glasser, and Rebecca Bovinet. I am also tremendously grateful to Cyra Akila Choudhury for the 
invitation to participate in this discussion, as well as my co-panelists Aziza Ahmed, Seema Mohapatra, 
Rachel Rebouché, and Lisa Kelly. 
1  For more about the specific ways in which the Canadian legal regime affects LGBTQ people 
seeking reproductive assistance, see Stu Marvel, “Tony Danza is My Sperm Donor?”: Queer Kinship 
and the Impact of Canadian Regulations Around Sperm Donation, 25 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 222 (2013). 
2  For a discussion of the network of legal and medical regulation that shapes access to assisted 
reproduction in Canada for LGBTQ people, and the inadequacy of a rights model to respond to this 
complex and shifting nexus, see Stu Marvel et al., Listening to LGBTQ People on Assisted Human 
Reproduction: Access to Reproductive Material, Services and Facilities, in REGULATING CREATION: 
THE LAW, ETHICS, AND POLICY OF ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION 406 (Trudo Lemmens et al. eds., 
2017). For a treatment of rights-based language around procreation and the potential pitfalls it may 
engender, see Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065 
(2016). 
3  Reproductive justice describes the effort to shift away from individual autonomy, control, 
privacy, and liberty, toward identifying and addressing group-based and community-level constraints 
and possibilities produced through structural power. This movement has been driven largely by women 
of color, who were frustrated by the rhetoric of individual rights and choice that inform demands to, for 
example, formal gender equality or access to abortion. Instead reproductive justice focuses on broader 
questions of racial, economic, cultural, and structural constraints on power. See, for example, JAEL 
SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
(2004); SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH COLLECTIVE AND THE PRO-CHOICE 
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To move forward this conversation on reproductive justice, however, I 
wish to take a step back into the past, and reflect upon more than three 
decades of struggle to regulate assisted human reproduction and genetic 
research in Canada. Told for its own sake this history is a remarkable one, 
uniquely inflected by feminist voices and conflicting positions on how best 
to handle the governance of a range of biotechnologies.4 Yet I believe this 
slice of Canadian history also holds useful lessons for reproductive justice 
scholars and activists in the United States and beyond. Canada is often held 
up as a model site for ART regulation by those interested in advancing 
reproductive justice; such admiring references point to the “integral role of 
feminist groups in Canada . . . in drafting and supporting the law” and 
approvingly cite the preamble to the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
(“AHRA”) as focused on “safeguarding the health of women and children, 
and preventing discrimination and the commercial exploitation of 
reproduction.”5 
To some extent, these admiring commentators are right—there was 
strong input from the feminist movement in Canada when such laws were 
being drafted. However, not only were such perspectives far from unified, 
they were often in thorny opposition. In tracking this rocky process of 
public decision-making and consultation, my paper will trace the arc of 
multiple and overlapping feminist positions from the early 1980s to the 
mid-1990s: radical feminists who called for bans against the gendered 
exploitation they perceived as inherent to ART; liberal feminists who 
sought increased capacity for individual and infertile women to make 
reproductive choices; and lesbian feminists who were both concerned about 
the reproductive needs of gay and lesbian communities being ignored, and 
focused on obtaining sexual freedom and the state recognition of same-sex 
relationships. In so doing, I will explore how a set of contested feminist 
 
PUBLIC EDUCATION PROJECT, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK: A PRIMER ON REPRODUCTIVE 
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2007), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php? 
fID=4051; REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: 
INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE; Loretta J. Ross et al., The “SisterSong 
Collective”: Women of Color, Reproductive Health and Human Rights, 17 AM. J. HEALTH STUD., no. 2, 
2001, at 79; Rebecca J. Cook & Bernard Dickens, From Reproductive Choice to Reproductive Justice, 
106 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 106 (2009). 
4  This is well-traveled terrain, with many other academic and popular commentators having 
traced this tale across the arcs of a convoluted history. Such texts will form many of the touchstones of 
this article, most notably the MISCONCEPTIONS books published in the wake of the controversies around 
the Royal Commission of New Reproductive Technology, infra note 11. For a new look at these 
debates, see a recently published anthology on reproduction and women’s rights in Canada, FERTILE 
GROUND: EXPLORING REPRODUCTION IN CANADA (Stephanie Paterson et al. eds., 2014). However, none 
have taken up the lens of queer family and reproductive justice to tell this story. 
5  Emily Galpern, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Overview and Perspective Using a 
Reproductive Justice Framework, REPROD. HEALTH & HUM. RTS. GENDER & JUST. PROGRAM, CENTER 
GENETICS & SOC’Y 18 (2007), https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/ART.pdf. 
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positions were instrumental in producing today’s regulatory framework for 
reproductive technology in Canada. This is, I believe, of interest not merely 
as a historical curiosity, but offers real insight into the relationship between 
advocacy, law, medicine, and power that can be instructive for those 
committed to promoting reproductive justice today. 
First, there are lessons to be learned in regard to how different 
ideological positions can manifest into advocacy stances and political goals. 
Particularly as different, and sometimes conflicting, feminist movements 
are brought into coalition through a shared belief in reproductive justice, 
historical memory is important to frame our project.6 This article explores 
how, despite the shared goal of developing a federal reproductive policy 
that would respect female bodies and autonomy, disparate feminist groups 
were woefully unable to agree on the design and implementation of such a 
policy. 
Second, this telling is not just about “feminisms at war” but about the 
types of positions that most readily find their way into forms of governance, 
and those modes of advocacy which become entrenched in law and policy. 
This analytical approach has been developed by Janet Halley and a cadre of 
scholars working under the rubric of “governance feminism,”7 and is 
interested in charting “the incremental but by now quite noticeable 
installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional 
power.”8 This brings into focus the political valence of how certain feminist 
ideas circulate and (crucially) adhere within legal domains, allowing us to 
account for internal fractures within feminist movements, as well as the 
process of consensus-building required to produce more formal materials 
such as organizational briefs and policy statements. As we will see, a 
diverse set of strategies emerged from the political and legal terrain in 
Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, as feminists sought to influence federal 
policy around reproductive technology. This rich spectrum of debate was 
increasingly channeled through national women’s organizations and official 
government channels as the decades wore on, eventually coming to 
 
6  For useful reflections on the conflicted history of reproductive rights movements, both in local 
and transnational contexts, see: DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, 
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND 
THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2003); RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA (2007); Rosalind P. Petchesky, Negotiating 
Reproductive Rights: Women’s Perspectives Across Countries and Cultures, 6 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 
MATTERS, no. 11 (1998). 
7 For the text which launched the concept of governance feminism as a term of art, see Janet 
Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex 
Work and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 336, 346, 364 (2006). 
8 Id. at 340. 
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coalesce in large part around tools of criminal enforcement.9 
Third, and this represents the other side of that prosecutorial coin, we 
might wish to explore which positions do not get taken up, and what 
institutional responses are not provoked by feminist movements. To quote 
again from Halley: “some parts of feminism participate more effectively 
than others; some are not players at all.”10 It is worth noting that official 
reports of the time made explicit account of both “feminist” and 
“mainstream” ideological positions expressed through public and private 
consultation.11 This neat conceptual binary obscured the roiling tensions 
within local and national feminist movements, as well as the failure of 
multiple strands of communitarian, lesbian, and anti-carceral perspectives to 
find political purchase on the official record. The recalcitrance of Canada’s 
legal and clinical ART regime to such perspectives may offer an instructive 
history for contemporary reproductive justice advocates who also favor 
grassroots and community-based modes of legal and political engagement;12 
for such readers, the “successes” of feminist organizing are perhaps less 
interesting than its “failures.” As this paper argues, those voices which 
proved most legible to government interests soon found themselves echoed 
down two intersecting and complementary regulatory channels—
medicalization and criminalization. 
 
 
9 This is very much in keeping with Halley’s thesis about the forms of power that are legible to 
techniques of governance. As Halley argues, governance feminism “emphasizes criminal enforcement. It 
speaks the language of total prohibition. It envisions the legal levers it pulls as activating a highly 
monolithic and state-centered form of power.” Id. at 341. Our historical retelling is rife with these 
abolitionist modes, as certain feminist vanguards targeted and were absorbed by the federal criminal 
power as a locus for political advocacy and policy creation. 
10 Id. 
11 This discursive binary between “feminist” and “mainstream” thinkers is one that settled in the 
work of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, as discussed below. For example, 
the Commission included thirteen proposed studies of embryo/fetal tissue research, five of which were 
divided into a request for “one mainstream study, one feminist study.” This epistemological framing 
creates an obvious tension between feminist perspectives and so-called “popular” thinking without 
indicating how or why such perspectives might differ. Such tension was evident not only in these forms 
of knowledge production, but across the makeup of the Commissioners themselves, who were later rent 
through internal divisions into “feminists” and “everybody else.” Judy G. Morrison, Delivery Delayed: 
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (June 5, 1997) (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Simon Fraser University) (on file with author). 
12  The relationship between liberatory and emancipatory feminist movements, on the one hand, 
and the repressive control exerted by state institutions, on the other, is structured by multiple and 
conflicting forms of power. An interesting treatment by Mimi Kim argues that such relationships tend 
towards the inherently paradoxical, as the more successful the social movement, the more likely its goals 
will be undermined by subordination to institutional power—a kinetic process that Kim dubs “the 
carceral creep.” Mimi Kim, Dancing the Carceral Creep: The Anti-Domestic Violence Movement and 
the Paradoxical Pursuit of Criminalization, 1973–1986, ISSI GRADUATE FELLOWS WORKING PAPER 
SERIES 2013–2014.70 (U. Cal., Berkley, Sch. Soc. Welfare Working Paper, October 14, 2015). 
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 TWIN REGULATORY CHANNELS: MEDICALIZATION AND    
 CRIMINALIZATION 
 
The concept of medicalization describes a process “in which 
nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical problems, 
usually in terms of illnesses or disorders.”13 
In our history, we will see how the medicalization of reproduction has 
involved the growth and professionalization of medical dominance under 
the auspices of the state, alongside the “regulation and management of 
populations and bodies in the interests of a discourse which identifies and 
controls that which is normal.”14 In regard to reproductive technology, the 
baseline of “normal” which emerges from this process is a white, 
heterosexual, middle-class, able-bodied reproductive couple—the 
standard—bearer of the family form. This branch of our story thus aims to 
offer a window into the relationship between public health policy and 
family law, and the ways in which the medicalization of human fertility has 
contributed to the promotion of certain forms of (genetically-related) 
family.15 
The other stream, that of criminalization, is reflected by the history of 
feminist organizing in Canada around (what were called at the time) new 
reproductive technologies or “NRTs”. We will trace how radical feminist16 
concerns around reproductive technology in the 1980s exerted real impact 
upon legal reform in Canada, encouraging a mode of feminist engagement 
which hinged upon a criminal law power and a top-down mode of 
centralized control. This second branch of our story will illustrate how the 
injection of certain feminist perspectives into the construction of public 
health policy encouraged the criminalization of paid gamete donors and 
surrogates, while paying scant attention to the needs of queer and poor 
people seeking to have children through ART. Thus, certain modes of 
 
13  BRYAN S. TURNER, MEDICAL POWER AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 208 (2d ed., 1995). 
14  Id. at 210; see also Peter Conrad, Medicalization and Social Control, 18 ANN. REV. SOC. 209, 
209 (1992). 
15  I have discussed the role of genetic (and non-genetic) relatedness in creating queer biokinship 
at length in other work. My argument is that the intrinsically messy parenting projects of assisted 
reproduction demand a re-thinking of the alignments and arrangements pursued under the frame of 
biological kinship. A queer perspective allows us to de-naturalize the procreative certainty of erotic 
heterosexual coupling and determine where, how and on what grounds that questions of access to 
assisted reproduction should be staked. See Stu Marvel, Polymorphous Reproductivity and the Critique 
of Futurity: Toward a Queer Legal Analytic for Fertility Law, in NEW INTIMACIES, OLD DESIRES: LAW, 
CULTURE AND QUEER POLITICS IN NEOLIBERAL TIMES, (Oishik Sircar & Dipika Jain eds., 2017). 
16  Competing ideologies within the women’s movement sought to influence the development of 
state policy around these technologies, with particular influence resting in the Canadian arm of a global 
network of radical feminists; a position which rejected reproductive technology as an instantiation of 
patriarchal control over women’s bodies. 
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feminism, and particularly those which lodge within the carceral state, have 
moved us further away from reproductive justice and related questions of 
access and reproductive entitlement. 
My focus in this work is on LGBTQ communities, and the ways in 
which this political history has shaped current possibilities for queer family 
in Canada. I hope thereby not merely to understand the regulatory channels 
through which feminist contestation may produce certain governance 
outcomes, although this is an important theoretical project. By 
foregrounding queer lives within this history, I aim to center the material 
ramifications for families who have been and remain underserved by the 
legislative and clinical regulation of ART in Canada. I believe this provides 
valuable insight into how the privileging of an idealized form of “normal” 
reproduction—predicated upon the two-parent, heterosexual, biological 
family—alongside the privileging of a criminalized regulatory response to 
ART, has created tangible effects for those who fall outside normative 
models of kinship. Such an insight can better recognize the needs of all 
families to provide a richer account of who can and cannot reproduce 
through ART, toward the protection and promotion of reproductive justice 
for all. 
 
 OUTLINE OF PAPER 
 
Section One of this paper will lay out a background to local and 
international feminist perspectives on reproductive technology in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and will conclude with the creation of a Canadian government 
commission tasked with a mandate to explore public sentiment around 
genetic and reproductive technologies. Section Two will discuss the 
stakeholders who addressed this task force and the different advocacy 
positions taken up, and overview the findings produced in the final report. 
Section Three will explore some of the legislative results (and non-results) 
that emerged in the wake of the commission’s report, and track these bills 
into law and the constitutional challenges that soon advanced. Section Four 
will conclude by discussing the gaps in representation and imagination that 
have impacted LGBTQ people today, and suggest some lessons for those 
concerned with ensuring access, resource support, and the creation of 
multiple family forms toward the goal of promoting reproductive justice. 
 
 SETTING THE SCENE: ANXIETIES OVER NEW TECHNOLOGY 
 
Today, nearly thirty years after the first government commission was 
struck to examine the issue of new reproductive technologies, Canada still 
lacks many guidelines for their regulation and provision. As bioethicist 
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Francoise Baylis has protested in frustration at this long series of regulatory 
failures and disappointments: 
Since the mid-1980s Canadians have advocated for the 
regulation of reproductive and genetic technologies. In 
1993, the final report of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies recommended federal 
legislation. In 2004, after many failed attempts, legislation 
was passed. And, in 2010 much of that legislation was 
found to be unconstitutional.17 
How did we get here? And what went wrong along the way? Such a 
genealogy must begin with the first challenge faced by regulators who 
sought to bring law and policy to bear in the laboratory: the difficulty of 
even defining what these new innovations were. When biotechnologies 
initially began to receive national press, particularly research in assisted 
reproduction and in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), they were often framed as 
elements of a strange and frightening scientific order. Surrogacy, test tube 
babies, cloning, and other reproductive technologies “became a pervasive 
theme in horror films and science fiction fantasies” as these new 
innovations “appeared to promise both amazing new control over nature 
and terrifying dehumanization.”18 Such dehumanization was soon 
understood to have specifically gendered effects. 
Indeed, perhaps nowhere have women’s bodies been more medically 
managed than in terms of their relationship to reproduction.19 As a site of 
anxiety for the disruption of the natural order, as Marcia Inhorn has 
explained in relation to studies of infertility, such projects make clear that 
“women’s bodies are considered the locus of ‘disease’, and hence the site of 
anxious surveillance and intervention.”20 This concern over the gendered 
nature of medicalization and its specific effects on female bodies has long 
been a central feminist concern, and one which animated much of the 
response to ART in the early 1980s. This section traces a variety of early 
feminist responses to reproductive technology, including both international 
 
17  Françoise Baylis, The Demise of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada, 34 J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY CAN. 511, 513 (2012). 
18  Dorothy Nelkin & M. Susan Lindee, Cloning in the Popular Imagination, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 145, 145 (1998); see Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting the Handmaid’s 
Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13 (2010), 
for a discussion of how Margaret Atwood’s popular novel fueled second-wave feminist concerns around 
women’s exploitation. 
19  Michelle Walks, Breaking the Silence: Infertility, Motherhood, and Queer Culture, 9 J. ASS’N 
FOR RES. ON MOTHERING 2 (2007). 
20  Marcia C. Inhorn & Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and 
Culture Change, 37 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 177, 178 (2008). The process of diagnosing a 
pathology requires its marking as deviance from the norm, thereby affirming a certain set of bodies and 
conditions as “healthy” and designating others as “unhealthy” and in need of treatment. 
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and distinctively Canadian movements. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL RADICAL FEMINIST MOVEMENT 
 
An early and vocal response to these dystopian imaginings was offered 
by radical feminist scholars through their suspicion of the potential for 
technological domination over women’s bodies. While this group 
comprised a diverse set of authors without consensus on many issues, their 
stance may roughly be characterized by the presumption of a foundational 
link between new reproductive technology and patriarchal culture.21 At the 
time, NRTs were viewed as an intensification of male scientific rationale 
directed toward dominion over female reproduction.22 From the position of 
many commentators, these were dangerous and untested procedures that 
were being forced upon women’s bodies as guinea pigs of experimental 
science.23 Such technologies were thus a force to be resisted and critiqued, 
and many radical feminists expressed suspicion of other women who 
willingly undertook procedures such as IVF; as collaborators with the 
patriarchal reproductive order, these women were hoodwinked pawns who 
doubted their own power.24 
But sometimes women also collude because we have been 
brainwashed. The information and education we get is one-
sided and male-centered and the hidden conviction creeps 
into our own minds that men and their technology must be 
better than our own body and our own experiences with it.25 
Unease with new reproductive technologies coalesced into a 
remarkably global feminist movement in the mid-1980s, with the 
 
21  Sarah Franklin, Transbiology: A Feminist Cultural Account of Being After IVF, in CRITICAL 
CONCEPTIONS: TECHNOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND THE GLOBAL REPRODUCTION MARKET 1 (Rebecca Jordan-
Young ed., 2011). See, for example, the founding anthology of feminist debates over new reproductive 
technology: TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1984). For 
a review of early feminist work on new reproductive technologies, see Sarah Franklin & Maureen 
McNeil, Reproductive Futures: Recent Literature and Current Debates on Reproductive Technologies, 
14 FEMINIST STUD. 545, 545–61 (1988). 
22  Transbiology: A Feminist Cultural Account of Being After IVF, supra note 21; see also MARY 
O’BRIEN, THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION (1981). 
23  Rebecca Albury, Who Owns the Embryo?, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR 
MOTHERHOOD? (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1984). 
24  Yet, as Sarah Franklin helpfully points out, this was by no means the only position among 
radical feminists (and certainly not among the feminist community at large). This easy equivocation of 
reproductive technology with patriarchy was also resisted by many. Transbiology: A Feminist Cultural 
Account of Being After IVF, supra note 21. 
25  Renate Duelli Klein, What’s “New” About the “New” Reproductive Technologies?, in MAN-
MADE WOMEN: HOW NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN 65 (Gena Corea et al. eds., 
1987). 
05-MARVEL 4.24.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  6:24 PM 
2016] Laws of Conception 89 
development of a network representing women from more than thirty 
countries.26 FINRRAGE, or the Feminist International Network of 
Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering, consisted of 
prominent social critics Gena Corea, Janice Raymond, Renate Klein, and 
Patricia Spallone, among many others. FINRRAGE was perhaps the most 
vocal wing of a movement concerned with guarding the “natural” 
reproductive functions of women from male control, and produced 
literature, analysis, and organized conferences to bring these issues to the 
fore. As the FINRRAGE manifesto states: 
We, women, declare that the female body, with its unique 
capacity for creating human life, is being exploited and 
dissected as raw material for the technological production 
of human beings. For us women, for nature, and for the 
exploited peoples of the world, this development is a 
declaration of war. Genetic and reproductive engineering is 
another attempt to end self-determination over our own 
bodies.27 
Radical feminists understood the expansion of reproductive technology 
within a patriarchal order as necessarily leading to women being exploited 
for their biological capacities. Drawing a parallel with prostitution and the 
commodification of female body parts through sexual labor, Corea 
envisioned a dystopic future in which the reproductive elements of a 
woman’s body would be stripped away and sold piecemeal: 
Just as the patriarchal state now finds it acceptable to 
market parts of a woman’s body (breast, vagina, buttocks) 
for sexual purposes in prostitution . . . so it will soon find it 
reasonable to market other parts of a woman (womb, 
ovaries, egg) for reproductive purposes.28 
Many members of FINRRAGE were deeply concerned with the issue 
of surrogate motherhood, and predicted that expanded reproductive 
technology would lead to the commodification of women as factories of 
reproductive labor. This outcome would impact women from lower socio-
economic brackets in particular, who would be reduced to “breeders” in this 
 
26  Gena Corea et al., FINRRAGE: The Struggle Over New Reproductive Technology, 
http://www.finrrage.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/FINRRAGE.pdf; see also Prologue to MADE TO 
ORDER: THE MYTH OF GENETIC AND REPRODUCTIVE PROGRESS, 1–12 (Patricia Spallone & Deborah 
Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987). 
27  Renate Duelli Klein, Genetic and Reproductive Engineering—The Global View, in THE BABY 
MACHINE: THE COMMERCIALISATION OF MOTHERHOOD 258 (Jocelyn A. Scutt, ed., 1988). 
28  Gena Corea, The Reproductive Brothel, in MAN MADE WOMEN: HOW NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN 42 (Gena Corea & Renate D. Klein eds., 1987). 
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new economy.29 As shaped by race and nationality, women of color and 
those of precarious legal status would be unable to resist the patriarchal 
imperative to reproduce for (male) profit. Yet white women were also seen 
as cogs in this patriarchal machine, forced to produce eggs of “superior” 
value to be incubated by bodies of color. Corea again was a powerful oracle 
on the matter, imagining a site of commerce she called the “reproductive 
brothel” where women both white and black would be used as breeding 
machines for the patriarchy: 
As I envision it, most women in a reproductive brothel 
would be defined as “nonvaluable” and sterilized and, in 
this way, their progeny culled. . . . Certainly women of 
color would be labeled “nonvaluable” and used as breeders 
for the embryos of “valuable” women. The white women 
judged genetically superior and selected as egg donors 
would be turned into machines for producing embryos. 
Through superovulation, “valuable” females as young as 2 
years and some as old as 50 or 60 could be induced to 
produce eggs.30 
There were of course many other feminist positions taken on the 
subject of new reproductive technologies,31 some of which explicitly sought 
to counterbalance the vivid prophesies of writers like Corea and Klein. For 
example, Naomi Pfeffer and Anne Woollett published an early 1983 
account of female infertility that was sympathetic to the issues faced by 
women in response to the oppositional tactics of more radical 
commentators.32 From the mid-1980s onward other FINRRAGE members 
also produced works on how and why women were accessing IVF and other 
reproductive technologies, seeking to moderate the “hard line” of feminist 
opposition to technology “which increasingly, to some, resembled a 
caricature of radical feminist goals.”33 
 
 
 
 
29 GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL 
INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS (1985). 
30  Id. at 278–79. 
31  Scholars like Donna Haraway were also writing during this period, using a Marxist feminist 
analysis to understand the relationship between technology and reproduction. In a slightly different 
forum, corporeal feminists such as Luce Irigaray, Moira Gatens, Gayatri Spivak, Hélène Cixous, and 
Elizabeth Grosz had been developing an understanding of the body itself as the site of inquiry, and a site 
produced through social systems of meanings and discourse. LUCE IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER 
WOMAN (Gillian C. Gill trans., 1974). 
32  NAOMI PFEFFER & ANNE WOOLLETT, THE EXPERIENCE OF INFERTILITY (1983). 
33  Transbiology: A Feminist Cultural Account of Being After IVF, supra note 21, at 2. 
05-MARVEL 4.24.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  6:24 PM 
2016] Laws of Conception 91 
 FEMINIST MOVEMENTS IN CANADA 
 
In Canada during this period, the women’s movement had been 
galvanized by the 1982 patriation of the Constitution, including the 
development of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that had seen sustained 
lobbying for constitutional reforms from organized movements in regard to 
Aboriginal rights and Québecois distinct society. Emerging from the same 
era was a campaign for women’s rights that drew speakers and leaders from 
across the country, as “a collective and highly focused campaign, a 
campaign in which many women who were lawyers played some of the key 
roles as advisors and strategists.”34 
This campaign successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a guarantee of 
equality in the wording of Section 15 of the new Charter, entrenching rights 
to protection of the law free from discrimination based on “race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”35 
The inclusion of “sex” in Section 15 marked an important milestone for the 
nascent Canadian women’s movement,36 while successful organization and 
activism around the lobbying effort had resulted in the establishment of the 
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”)—a body which 
continues to exert a considerable influence on women’s rights in Canada.37 
 
34  M.J. Mossman, The Paradox of Feminist Engagement with the Law, in FEMINIST ISSUES: 
RACE, CLASS AND SEXUALITY 180, 182 (Nancy Mandell ed., 2d ed. 1998). See also CONSTITUTE THIS! 
(International Women’s Rights Project 1998) for archival footage of the era and the complex debates 
which pushed the Canadian women’s movement forward. 
35  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). Sexual orientation was not included in this list of 
grounds, despite an amendment that called for its enumeration proposed by then-Member of Parliament 
Svend Robinson. A parliamentary committee rejected the amendment by twenty-two votes against and 
two for, with then Minister of Justice, Jean Chrétien, saying, “We have explained that there are other 
grounds of discrimination that will be defined by the courts. We wanted to have an enumeration of 
grounds and we do not think it should be a list that can go on forever.” Robert Wintemute, Sexual 
Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement of Formal Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits, 49 
MCGILL L. J. 1145, 1146 (2004); see also Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st Sess., 32d 
Parl., Issue No. 48 at 48:20–1, 48:31–4. 
36  This remains the case, no matter how limited the actual gains from the Charter may have 
been. See Bruce Ryder’s work on Charter equality provisions, including: Bruce Ryder et al., What’s Law 
Good For? An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions, 24 SUP. CT. L. REV. 1 (2004); 
Bruce Ryder & Taufiq Hashmani, Managing Charter Equality Rights: The Supreme Court of Canada’s 
Disposition of Leave to Appeal Applications in Section 15 Cases, 1989–2010, 51 SUP. CT. L. REV. 505 
(2010). See also Margot Young’s critical work in this area, including: Margot E. Young, Blissed Out: 
Section 15 at Twenty, 33 SUP. CT. L. REV. 45 (2006); Margot E. Young, Unequal to the Task: 
“Kapp”ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15, 50 SUP. CT. L. REV. 183 (2010). 
37  LEAF is a national, charitable, non-profit organization, founded in 1985. LEAF works to 
advance the substantive equality rights of women and girls in Canada through litigation, law reform, and 
public education using the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. LEAF works to ensure Canadian 
courts provide the equality rights guaranteed to women and girls by Section 15 of the Canadian Charter, 
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Another federal organization representing women’s issues at the time was 
the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (“NAC”), which 
came out of the Charter debates as a strong force in dialogue with the 
government. NAC would soon mature into a central player in advocating 
against the widespread and uncritical adoption of new reproductive 
technologies. 
Indeed, issues of reproductive technology were already on the map in 
Canada by the time of the Charter discussions. The 1978 birth of Louise 
Brown in Britain as the world’s first successful IVF baby had global 
impact, indicating the potential for heretofore unseen ethical issues in 
human reproduction. Four years later, in 1982, there was a much-publicized 
case of a couple from a small town in Ontario arranging a contract with a 
surrogate from Florida.38 
The absence of government regulation over these types of negotiations 
became a cause of concern for many Canadian feminists, with local 
perspectives heavily impacted by the international discussion. Many echoed 
FINRRAGE in expressing a range of fears regarding the exploitation of 
women’s bodies. Sunera Thobani, for example, argued that these 
technologies would: 
[S]erve to increase the control by the racist, patriarchal, 
scientific and medical communities over women’s 
reproductive abilities. The control of women’s reproductive 
ability and sexuality, the control of women’s bodies, is a 
cornerstone of patriarchal power. We are seeing the 
extension of this patriarchal control over women’s bodies 
through the development of this technology.39 
Lesbian scholar Somer Brodribb, in a 1986 paper in the Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law, echoed many of these concerns. Brodribb 
also expressed worry about “the ways in which patriarchal jurisprudence is 
moving to absorb and direct medical developments in reproductive 
technology.”40 As a Canadian contact for FINNRAGE, she rejected the use 
of NRTs as a patriarchal strategy of dominance aimed at removing 
 
and is a frequent intervener in Supreme Court cases involving gender issues. 
38 The couple paid $20,000 to the woman, and in exchange she came to Canada, gave birth to the 
child, and left the country shortly afterward. Although the child was initially seized by the Metro 
Toronto Catholic Children’s Aid Society, the baby was eventually returned to the couple, with the 
Ontario Supreme Court ruling that the Scarborough man was the legal and biological father. Somer 
Brodribb, Off the Pedestal and Onto the Block? Motherhood, Reproductive Technologies, and the 
Canadian State, 1 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 407, 415 (1986); see Ellie Tesher, “I Need Laws on Surrogate 
Motherhood,” Judge Says, TORONTO STAR (June 26, 1982); Judge Rules “Surrogate” Has Right to 
Keep Baby, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL (June 6, 1981). 
39 Sunera Thobani, More than Sexist . . . , HEALTHSHARING, Spring 1991, at 10, 13. 
40 Brodribb, supra note 38, at 407, 417. 
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reproductive autonomy from the hands of women, arguing that “the 
masculinist, racist, and classist nature of scientific rationality, and its 
consequent devastation of women and nature, demonstrates that these 
technologies are not neutral.”41 Brodribb was particularly concerned that 
any governmental push to regulate NRTs would be motivated by the 
perceived threat to fatherhood, and therefore to patriarchy, and would result 
in a slew of court cases that were likely undermine the future potential of 
legal recognition for gay and lesbian parents.42 
Discourses of commercialization and fears of Corea’s “reproductive 
brothels” coming to pass were also prevalent. The high cost of interventions 
such as IVF were viewed as a mechanism to keep them out of the grasp of 
anyone but white middle-class women, thereby ensuring the sterility of the 
disabled, non-white, and lower classes.43 There was seen to be real potential 
for a new eugenics movement, with a belief that “NRTs are actually just 
new ways to reproduce OLD inequalities.”44 
As with the global setting, of course, many other feminist voices 
emerged during the 1980s and early 1990s, some of which took a positive 
stance on ART and saw them as useful options for women and their 
families. These perspectives emerged powerfully from the infertility 
community, with women arguing for the coverage of IVF cycles within 
Canada’s framework of socialized medicine.45 Nevertheless the dominant 
discourse remained strongly inflected by a radical feminist critique which 
stood wary of the harmful effects of commercialization on women’s bodies. 
A concern for inequality as exacerbated by medical expertise, the 
biotechnology industry, and scientific research came to the fore, creating a 
national discourse that “successfully forged an inextricable link . . . between 
 
41 Brodribb’s position as both an out lesbian and a member of FINNRAGE illustrates the slippery 
nature of ideological positions, and the imprecision of creating feminist taxonomies that would bracket 
radical feminism from lesbian feminism. Id. at 408. 
42  Id. 
43 Anthropologist Sari Tudiver, for example, wrote of the negative effects on women and children 
already being wrought by a global economy. She predicted that new reproductive technologies would 
only exacerbate and expand existing inequalities, with embryos being harvested for organs and tissues 
and women being sold into reproductive slavery. Women who chose not to have children, or who could 
not conceive, would be labeled as deviant or selfish as the social value of women was narrowed down to 
their biological capacity to reproduce. Tudiver feared that ART was thereby poised to reinforce a white, 
middle-class ableist concept of motherhood as well as entrenching women’s social role as mother, while 
threatening to legitimize discrimination based on race, gender, class, and ability. Sari Tudiver, Canada 
and the Global Context of the New Reproductive Technologies: A Cautionary Essay, in 
MISCONCEPTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHOICE AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE AND 
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES 67–70 (Gwynne Basen et al. eds., 1993). 
44  Tannis Doe, The New Reproductive Technologies: Discriminating Misconceptions of Choice, 
HERIZONS, Spring 1994, at 45. 
45  Mavis Jones & Brian Salter, Proceeding Carefully: Assisted Human Reproduction Policy in 
Canada, 19 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 426, 426 (2010). 
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the profit potential of human reproductive technologies and the systemic 
oppression of women.”46 
Concerns over commodification, male oppression, and exacerbated 
inequality thus provided the main drivers in the feminist community. By the 
mid-1980s, groups such as NAC had taken up Corea’s reproductive brothel 
framework, arguing that new reproductive technologies would turn women 
into “breeders” of the human race. Drawing upon Canadian author Margaret 
Atwood’s popular dystopian novel, about a future where a fertile underclass 
of women are compelled to act as reproductive servants, or “handmaids,” to 
a non-fertile elite, such nightmare scenarios gave a uniquely Canadian spin 
on what would come to be if ART was not adequately regulated.47 
 
 STEPS TOWARD REGULATION IN CANADA 
 
The case of the small-town couple who had commissioned an 
American surrogate, and the flurry of media surrounding it, was generally 
viewed as a driver behind a 1982 request to the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission to develop a report on the legal implications of NRTs. The 
next year, the Ontario Law Reform Commission produced their Report on 
Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters (“Report”) to no small 
degree of consternation. According to a 1986 critique by Mary Anne 
Coffey, the Report was not an examination of the technologies so much as a 
social prescription for their control.48 She also soundly criticized the 
document for taking a patriarchal and heterosexist worldview which limited 
access to heterosexuals and heterosexual relationships, “while female 
reproductive and social independence from men is penalized or rendered 
problematic.”49 The Report also left control entirely in the hands of medical 
and legal professionals, without apparent concern for women’s issues and 
knowledge about their own bodies.50 As Coffey wrote with urgency, these 
were vital matters that needed to be addressed by feminist thinkers and 
political actors: 
For feminists concerned with the social effects of 
reproductive technology, this is therefore a crucial time: 
technical knowledge and applications are advancing much 
 
46  Id. 
47  Indeed, NAC even took the title of Atwood’s book as the title of their submission to the 
forthcoming Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. NAC, A Technological 
Handmaid’s Tale: Executive Summary, CWMA NAC fond X10-24, box 651 file 5, ii. 
48  Mary Anne Coffey, Of Father Born: A Lesbian Feminist Critique of the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission Recommendations on Artificial Insemination, 1 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 424, 431 (1985–86). 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 433. 
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more rapidly than corresponding social definition and 
ordering, which means that public policy is in a state of 
flux and is likely to remain so for some time to come. New 
systems of socio-ethical interpretation and legal regulation 
are currently under construction in many jurisdictions or 
have only recently been formulated in law. Newly enacted 
statutes may be difficult to amend, but the current proposals 
for Canadian federal and provincial legislation are still 
subject to public debate and as such can be influenced by 
feminist criticism and lobbying efforts.51 
Coffey was especially concerned for the inclusion of lesbian 
perspectives in these critical and lobbying efforts, for as she saw it: “If 
proposed legislation does not meet the material needs of all women, 
including lesbian women, it must be countered with informed dissent and 
active resistance by feminists.”52 Despite the presence of deep and growing 
tensions within the feminist movement—largely framed by a disjuncture 
between more liberal perspectives which sought to provide women 
(including lesbians) with reproductive choices, and those which sought a 
moratorium on access to all forms of ART—there developed an awareness 
that government regulation should not be allowed to pass without comment. 
Notwithstanding a suspicion of the patriarchal state, the goal of the 
movement soon became one of additional regulation and engagement as a 
way to reign in the medicalization of women’s bodies: “Feminist activists 
feared that scientists and doctors, as the perceived traditional enforcers of 
women’s reproductive roles, would increase their control over women’s 
reproductive health unless the federal government took steps to set national 
standards over NRTs and impose restrictions on certain practices.”53 It was 
demanded that government, not just the medical and research communities, 
take control of regulation to ensure the safety of women.54 
FINRRAGE had studied a series of governmental reports, which were 
commissioned to provide advice on the management of new reproductive 
technologies.55 These included the aforementioned report from the Ontario 
Law Reform Commission, as well as the Warnock Report and the Waller 
 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Tanya Daley, The Politics of “Choice”: Canadian Feminism and the Royal Commission on 
New Reproductive Technologies (2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Ottawa) (on file with 
author); see also Ann Pappert, Can Feminism Survive Test-Tube Revolution?, in THE REPRODUCTIVE 
REVOLUTION: SPECIAL REPORT BY ANN PAPPERT (1989). 
54  Jones & Salter, supra note 45. 
55  Patricia Spallone, Reproductive Technology and the State: The Warnock Report and its 
Clones, in MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC PROGRESS 167 (Patricia 
Spallone & Deborah Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987). 
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Report. All had been deemed to lack a clear feminist research agenda.56 
Patricia Spallone, a prominent FINRRAGE member, described these 
documents as capitulations by government to the interests of scientific 
capital which failed to protect women’s needs and integrity.57 
Canadian feminists concluded that without their participation, it was 
likely that any emergent legislation would simply reinforce patriarchal 
value systems.58 Worried that a federal study would follow in the footsteps 
of the United Kingdom and Australia, not to mention the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission, it was seen as vital that a feminist approach be part of 
any analysis of the emergence of NRTs.59 Thus, a collection of feminist 
activists, academics, and health advocates came together in the spring of 
1987 to form the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies under the guidance of sociologist Margrit 
Eichler, with the goal of heightening public awareness and sparking a 
federal investigation of the impact of reproductive technologies.60  Of 
course this position was not shared by all within the broader women’s 
community, with some speaking against the Commission format as a 
process which would remain inaccessible to feminist influence.61 
A Royal Commission was nevertheless the targeted vehicle for a 
feminist-led inquiry into new reproductive technology, due to its substantial 
budget, research staff, ability to foster public debate, and the perceived 
success of a Royal Commission on the Status of Women which had run 
from 1967 to 1971.62 The Royal Commission was to be the access point for 
feminists to the state, and they sought to define its mandate from the start.63 
As Mavis Jones and Brian Salter describe: “By framing the policy problem 
as one of protecting the vulnerable from exploitation, they brought the 
social and ethical implications of genetic technologies into sharp relief.”64 
After two years of sustained lobbying, the Coalition’s efforts were 
successful. In the autumn of 1989, the government announced the 
 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Margrit Eichler, Frankenstein Meets Kafka: The Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, in MISCONCEPTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHOICE AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES 196–222 (Gwynne Basen et al. eds., 1993). 
59  Jones & Salter, supra note 45. 
60  Eichler, supra note 58.  
61  Annette Burfoot, In-appropriation—A Critique of Proceed With Care: Final Report of the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 18 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 499, 500 (1995); 
see Somer Brodribb & Louise Vandelac, Panel Three: Ethics of the Body L’ethique du Corps, in 
FEMINIST ETHICS 60–68 (Kathleen Martindale ed., 1987). 
62  Burfoot, supra note 61. 
63  Lorna Weir & Jasmin Habib, A Critical Feminist Analysis of the Final Report of the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 52 STUD. POL. ECON. 137, 147 (1992). 
64  Jones & Salter, supra note 45, at 12. 
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appointment of a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
(“RCNRT”) which would not consider biotechnology as solely a matter of 
interest to economic policy. Instead the RCNRT would operate on a 
mandate: 
[T]o examine current and potential scientific and medical 
developments related to reproductive technologies, but also 
to go beyond them to consider: 
•    the impact of the technologies on society as a whole; 
•   their impact on identified groups in society, specifically 
women, children, and families; and— 
• the ethical, legal, social, economic, and health 
implications of these technologies.65 
A pediatrician and medical geneticist named Patricia Baird was tapped 
to lead, and provided with a budget of $24.7 million to fulfill this sweeping 
mandate. Commissioners included two self-identified feminists as well as a 
lesbian named Dr. Grace Marion Jantzen,66 a professor of religion who was 
Canadian-born, but living and lecturing in London, England.67 There was, 
however, no representation from the heterosexual infertile community, or 
other patient-advocacy groups who might be expected to hold concern for 
questions of access and state-funding for reproductive technology.68 Nor 
was there any representation by people of color, Aboriginal people, or 
members of the disability community. Nevertheless, hopes for the RCNRT 
were high. 
 
65  ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (1993) [hereinafter 
PROCEED WITH CARE]. 
66  Interestingly, most of the feminist writings about the Royal Commission, and especially the 
rift that was to occur between Baird and certain Commissioners, do not mention Jantzen’s lesbianism 
nor her feminist scholarship. Yet Jantzen, a Quaker and a leading voice in the feminist philosophy of 
religion, would later bring the work of Irigaray, Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida to feminist theology and 
the philosophy of religion, and challenge the preoccupations of male-dominated Western philosophy 
which Jantzen saw as driven by a concern with death. Her work with the RCNRT in particular had 
demonstrated to Jantzen the “glaring interconnection between power and gender” in the study of new 
reproductive technologies, and she reflected on her time with the Royal Commission as a period in 
which she “began to take serious notice of who are the beneficiaries and who are the victims of systems 
of power/knowledge. In the case of new reproductive technologies, the beneficiaries are those with 
powerful vested interests: pharmaceutical companies, big science, big business. The victims, too often, 
are women, children, aboriginal people, disabled people, ethnic minorities.” GRACE M. JANTZEN, 
POWER, GENDER AND CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM xv (1995). See also a eulogy written upon her death in 
2006: Jeremy Carrette, Grace Jantzen: A Feminist Voice Expanding the Philosophy of Religion, 
GUARDIAN (May 11, 2006). 
67  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at 3. 
68  As Tanya Daley notes in her M.A. thesis on infertility communities, due to the treatment of 
infertility as a private issue, there was little public discussion at the time on the topic, and the infertile 
were not recognized as a distinct community in the way cultural/racial minorities and LGBTQ 
communities were. Daley, supra note 53, at 69. 
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 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
The Commission’s progress was never smooth, and continued delays 
in appointing key staff, organizing research plans and coordinating public 
consultations resulted in frustration both inside and outside the RCNRT. 
There were allegations of irregular research ethics and a lack of 
transparency, and the Commission kept data, protocols, and selection of 
personnel under wraps with research shielded from peer review.69 
Nevertheless, nationwide public hearings eventually commenced, and 
women’s groups took the lead in responding.70 
 
 
 
69 Weir & Habib, supra note 63. 
70  The Commission also undertook a series of public polls, including a survey on the topic of 
“Social Values and Attitudes,” which included a section on gay and lesbian families. Conducted by 
phone and in writing between December 1991 and July 1992, this survey purported to gain a greater 
understanding of Canadians’ general outlook with regard to a sense of tolerance and equality. To this 
end, it included “several items asking about the principle of equality; attitudes toward immigration and 
the extent to which Canadians welcome others to our society; tolerance levels for homosexual 
relationships; and general attitudes toward women and women’s role in society.” PROCEED WITH CARE, 
supra note 65, at 28. 
 The survey found that 90% of participants agreed with the gender equality provisions in Section 15 
of the Charter, with over two-thirds in strong agreement. Similarly, a majority felt that equality between 
men and women had not been achieved (69%), and that women gaining more power in society would 
have a positive impact overall (76%). However, when it came to the matter of “homosexual 
relationships” the answers were scattered widely, with 35% expressing acceptance, 21% having no 
opinion, 16% saying they were unacceptable, and 27% finding such relationships totally unacceptable. 
PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at 29. In another part of the survey it was asked whether a 
homosexual couple with children constituted a family. Thirty-seven percent of respondents answered in 
the affirmative, while just 13% considered a childless homosexual couple to be a family. Id. at 43. 
 When it came to reproductive technology and gays and lesbians, the responses were even more 
polarized. According to survey results, 74% of respondents supported reproductive technology to help 
an infertile heterosexual couple conceive. The specific scenario of a single woman using anonymous 
donor sperm was supported by 30% of respondents, while a lesbian couple using donor sperm was 
supported by just 11%. Id. at 43. The scenario of a gay male couple using a surrogate was not raised. 
 It is important to note that the polls themselves were not without criticism, with concern coming 
even from within the RCNRT’s ranks. Commissioner Louise Vandelac spoke out publically against the 
methodology as the only social scientist with extensive experience with surveys and opinion polls, 
expressing worry that the use of polls as a route to determine public policy was a dangerous and flawed 
course. Louise Vandelac, From Bird to Baird: The Royal Commission ne Suivent Mais ne Suivent Mais 
ne se Resembleur pas, Presentation at the Association Nationale de la Femme et du Droite, Vancouver, 
BC (Feb. 19–21, 1993). As Vandelac made clear, polls were seen to be questionable instruments for a 
variety of reasons: they may be carried out by companies who may lack expertise in the particular 
subject matter; they may be executed with flawed or inadequate background information; they may be 
financed by potentially biased organizations; they lack direct contact with the individual, which may be 
particularly inappropriate for sensitive topics such as NRTs; they may contain leading or misleading 
questions; complex responses are difficult if not impossible to capture; poll results are sometimes 
difficult to interpret; and polling overall leads to the impression of wide public engagement when such 
consultation is far from meaningful. 
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 REPRESENTATION BY RADICAL FEMINIST GROUPS SEEKING  
  PROHIBITION 
 
Over fifty women’s groups made submissions to the Royal 
Commission from 1990 to 1992.71 Overwhelmingly, these groups called for 
the regulation of NRTs from a feminist perspective, asking the government 
to understand the political, social, and economic factors that shaped 
women’s realities. The social construction of motherhood was especially 
critiqued, with groups calling attention to the way that these technologies 
served to institutionalize women’s “natural” role as wife and mother. A 
group from Laval University, Le Groupe de Recherche Multidisciplinaire 
Feminist, argued that women were no longer under pressure from the clergy 
and law to have children, yet Western society was perpetuating the idea that 
real womanhood was not achieved unless women gave birth, thus forcing 
them to seek the status of birth mother.72 
NAC came down even more strongly against these technologies, 
calling for a halt on the construction of new IVF clinics, a ban on all 
commercial trade in sperm and ova, and a ban on commercial surrogacy.73 
NAC also sought to ban sex-selection testing and to preclude court-ordered 
obstetrical interventions. In a brief which took its title and inspiration from 
Atwood’s novel The Handmaid’s Tale, about a captive “breeder” class of 
women, NAC argued that: 
[T]hese technologies represent the wrong direction in 
society’s attempt to solve the problems of infertility. We 
believe that, on balance, the new reproductive technologies 
are oppressive to women. They are not effective in 
preventing or curing infertility or disability but will 
contribute to economic and social trends that erode 
women’s overall rights, well-being, and social standing.74  
Instead, they suggested a focus on the prevention of infertility and 
maternal support programs to address the causes of infant disability, as well 
as research into the emotional and physical impact of IVF on mothers and 
children.75 
Representation by Liberal Feminists Seeking Improved Choices 
In the opposite camp, infertility associations were some of the best-
 
71  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65. 
72  Daley, supra note 53. 
73  NATIONAL ACTION COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES: A TECHNOLOGICAL HANDMAIDS TALE: A BRIEF PRESENTED TO THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1991). 
74  Id. at 4. 
75  Id. at 29–30. 
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organized national voices arguing against the prohibition of reproductive 
technologies. Such groups were largely represented by the Infertility 
Awareness Association of Canada, who had placed a call to its members in 
developing a submission to the RCNRT.76 The potential for federal 
restrictions on ART was a cause for concern, and the IAAC responded with 
panic.77 The IAAC’s brief was also focused on the social construction of 
motherhood and the pressures of a pro-natalist society, but from the 
perspective of infertile citizens who demanded entrance into this culture.78 
The brief discussed the social pressure felt by the infertile and their sadness, 
loss, anger, guilt, and feelings of exclusion from the fundamental identity of 
parenthood.79 
The submission included a statement from Marie Morrissey of the 
IAAC, who declared that the infertile heterosexuals of society perceived 
themselves as isolated, marginalized, and even excluded from the health 
care system because they were viewed as having “unimportant problems.”80 
Access to ART would allow the infertile to overcome their disability81 and 
participate in society. Regulatory focus was thus trained not on the looming 
potential for danger created by an autocratic patriarchy, but for unrestricted 
access to fertility services and, crucially, the funding of such services under 
provincial healthcare regimes.82 Representatives from the IAAC publicly 
opposed the position staked out by NAC, out of fear that NAC’s campaign 
could substantially limit their future access to reproductive assistance.83 
This pivotal disagreement over issues of access to ART, and the claims 
of infertile women to reproductive autonomy and the choice of IVF, led to a 
bitter rift within the feminist community.84 Some women left NAC because 
of its position on the strict regulation of all reproductive technology, 
including the ban on surrogate motherhood. Indeed, as Tanya Daley reports, 
the pages of the IAAC newsletter and the IAAC submission to the Royal 
Commission depict not only the pain of being childless, but also the sadness 
and anger felt by those women who had been part of a feminist movement 
 
76  Daley, supra note 53, at 82. 
77  Id. 
78  Infertility Awareness Association of Canada (“IAAC”), Submission to the Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies, LAC RCNRT RG33-154, file no. PH-9-OT (Apr. 30, 1992), at 1. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Infertile people identified themselves as reproductively disabled, with 53.5% of the IAAC’s 
surveyed membership affirming that “infertility is a disability.” Paula Timmons & Trish Maynard, 
IAAC’s Royal Commission Survey, INFERTILITY AWARENESS, May, 1991, at 1, 11. 
82  Id. 
83  Nancy Jackson, The Royal Commission—It’s Time to Speak Out!, INFERTILITY AWARENESS, 
May/June, 1989, at 6. 
84  Id. 
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that they now perceived as excluding them. As described by Karen 
Woolridge, a regular contributor to Infertility Awareness: “I mourned the 
loss of friends in the women’s movement and the loss of the support of the 
community itself.”85 During these transitions IAAC was silent on the issue 
of gays and lesbians and their access to reproductive technology, as its 
focus remained only on heterosexual couples suffering from infertility. 
 
REPRESENTATION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS SEEKING RECOGNITION 
OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Gay and lesbian groups were represented directly at the Royal 
Commission, although at this point in the movement the focus was 
primarily on fighting for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. In 
the submission to the RCNRT by Equality for Gays and Lesbians 
Everywhere (“EGALE”), a national advocacy organization based in Ottawa, 
the group stated that the gay and lesbian community had chosen to stay out 
of this debate until the fundamental issue of the legal recognition of same-
sex relationships was addressed.86 However, they did warn against the 
potential restriction of insemination to heterosexual couples as “morally 
wrong.”87 As they explained, to ban gays and lesbians from access to 
reproductive technologies and materials would further constrict the legal 
definition of the family as a heterosexual entity, thereby seriously 
compromising the struggle for equal rights.88 
While NAC made one reference in its brief to the reproductive needs 
of lesbians (in regard to the barriers faced in accessing IVF), they made no 
mention of gay men. Members of the group were certainly aware that same-
sex female couples were far more likely to use assisted insemination with a 
known or anonymous donor than IVF, yet the language remained focused 
on technological provision rather than access to gametes.89 Nor was the 
barring of lesbians from fertility clinics flagged as a concern by either 
EGALE or NAC, despite the fact that the brief coincided with a period of 
history in which same-sex couples faced substantial hurdles in accessing 
reproductive technology. As testified before the RCNRT a few years later, a 
study from that era had found that nineteen out of thirty-three surveyed 
clinics reported an intent to deny services to women who identified as 
 
85  Karen Woolridge, Feminism at the Conference, INFERTILITY AWARENESS, July/Aug., 1991, at 
12. 
86  EGALE, Brief Presented to the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies by 
Les McAffee and Cecelia McWilliams, LAC RCNRT RG33-154, file no. PH-15-OT. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Coffey, supra note 48. 
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lesbian.90 A case from British Columbia, which began in 1993, indicated 
that such refusals were not an uncommon part of clinical practice.91 
Commissioners for the RCNRT also heard from single women and 
lesbians who described the forms of discrimination they had experienced in 
the traditional medical setting.92 Some witnesses told the Commission that 
the “over-medicalization of assisted insemination using donor sperm has 
created a situation in which medical practitioners have become 
gatekeepers,” enforcing what they perceive to be community standards 
about family formation by establishing access criteria that exclude single or 
lesbian women.93 For example, a representative from the Halifax Lesbian 
Committee on New Reproductive Technologies expressed concern about 
the categorization of donor insemination as a medical technology:           
“[A] problematic . . . recommendation is a designation of alternative 
insemination as the practice of medicine. . . . This would make self-
insemination subject to legal prosecution.”94 
Similarly, other women expressed concern that the utilization of new 
reproductive technologies not be limited to married heterosexual couples. 
Drawing upon a feminist framework that stressed inclusion over restriction, 
historian Katherine Arnup testified to the RCNRT as a private citizen, 
urging that broad access to ART be granted to all Canadians: 
Increasingly the use of all of the new reproductive 
technology is being limited to married or at least cohabiting 
 
90  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at 454. 
91  The dispute arose after Dr. Korn, a Vancouver fertility specialist, had been obliged to provide 
expert witness testimony to a custody and support case involving two lesbians—a former patient and her 
partner. (The case was Anderson v. Luoma (1986), 50 R.F.L. 2d 127 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.)). While the 
names of the women were protected, Korn’s was not, and he received unwanted publicity for his role in 
the case, including telephone calls criticizing him for providing artificial insemination to lesbians. He 
subsequently announced his refusal to provide reproductive assistance to all lesbian women, although he 
would still provide other medical services. Pursuant to this policy he refused to provide assisted 
insemination to a same-sex couple who had sought out his medical practice in April 1993, instead 
referring them to other physicians. The women lodged an unsuccessful complaint with the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia asking that Korn be disciplined for unethical actions. They 
then lodged another complaint with the British Columbia Council of Human Rights, which found that 
Korn did not have justification to deny them services under the British Columbia Human Rights Act. 
The grounds of this complaint were that Korn denied the women “a service or facility customarily 
available to the public” due to “sexual orientation and/or family status, contrary to s.3 of the Human 
Rights Act of British Columbia.” A judicial review of the decision by the British Columbia Supreme 
Court found that the human rights complaint had been decided correctly, with Korn indeed in violation 
of the Act. As the first case to be decided after “sexual orientation” was added as a protected ground in 
the British Columbia Human Rights Code in 1992, this was a major victory for lesbians seeking access 
to donor sperm in British Columbia. See Korn v. Potter (1996), 22 B.C.L.R. 3d 163 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
92  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at 385. 
93  Id. 
94  M. Patrell, Halifax Lesbian Committee on New Reproductive Technologies, Public Hearings 
Transcripts, Halifax, Nova Scotia (Oct. 17, 1990), in PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65. 
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heterosexual couples. Single women, whether they are 
heterosexual or lesbian, find themselves denied access to 
fertility treatment and to artificial insemination (“AI”). And 
I am here today to suggest that it is critical that these 
technologies not be limited to a select population. I believe 
that access to AI should not be influenced by race, class, 
physical disability, marital status or sexual orientation.95 
The Commission also learned about what was termed self-
insemination (“SI”), through studies based on the experiences of lesbian 
women who had used SI and others who had been involved in its 
provision.96 Women who chose SI reported a desire to have control over the 
process, to avoid intercourse, to avoid unnecessary medications, or to avoid 
having to justify their wish to be a parent to clinical staff.97 The majority of 
women who chose SI used anonymous donors for fear of legal 
complications and from a desire to raise the child without the involvement 
of the donor. Although some said they were able to get safe frozen sperm 
from “friendly MDs,” this was the exception, not the rule.98 
Primarily lesbian-organized assisted insemination networks were also 
discussed, as was their aim of providing knowledge, resources, and access 
to donor sperm.99 Reports indicated that these networks were mainly using 
fresh sperm, with little information available about the donors; at the time 
of the proceedings, only one group of women in Ontario had their own 
equipment to cryopreserve sperm.100 The issue of fresh sperm was 
beginning to emerge as a site for medical regulation, due largely to the 
ballooning AIDS crisis and an impression that lesbians were frequently 
relying upon gay men to act as donors.101 The Commission heard how HIV 
testing and screening for STDs was fairly rare, as “in interviews with 19 
women involved in SI networks, only 9 reported that donors were tested for 
HIV, and only 7 used frozen sperm.”102 As we will see, these concerns 
about health screening and data-keeping protocols were to be reflected 
directly in the RCNRT final report, with the regulatory goals of 
medicalization and criminalization taking precedence over lesbian-
 
95  K. Arnup, Private Citizen, Public Hearings Transcripts, Toronto, Ontario (Nov. 20, 1990), in 
PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65. 
96  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at 459. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Brodribb similarly describes how a group of unmarried and lesbian women in Windsor, 
Ontario, established the first Canadian women’s artificial insemination service in June 1982. Brodribb, 
supra note 38, at 415. 
100  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
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articulated questions of access and grassroots support. 
These were the complex and often competing messages conveyed to 
the RCNRT, with the “feminist” position that became dominant throughout 
the hearings roughly typified as one of prohibition, especially in regard to 
commercial surrogacy, commercial trade in gametes and expanded access to 
IVF.103 
 
 PUBLICATION OF PROCEED WITH CARE 
 
When Proceed With Care, the final report of the Baird Commission, 
was finally released in late 1993, it spanned 1275 pages housed in two 
volumes, was supported by fifteen volumes of research findings, and put 
forth 293 recommendations. It was also nearly two years late and three 
million dollars over budget.104 While some initially responded with relief at 
its apparent gender sensitivity,105 others were disappointed that the 
 
103  Even as these messages churned slowly through the wheels of the RCNRT, frustration with 
its operations and lack of transparency had reached a boiling point. Despite the Commission’s origin as 
being “born of lobbying by feminist groups, it had been rapidly disowned by women’s organizations.” 
Charlotte Gray, The Report on New Reproductive Technologies: Will it Lead to Change, or Gather 
Dust?, CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 266 (1994). Indeed, by late 1991 the head of NAC at the time, Judy Rebick, 
had publicly declared a lack of confidence in the Commission and in the apparent hostility of 
Chairperson Baird to the inclusion of feminist perspectives. DAVID LEYTON-BROWN, CANADIAN 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 46 (1991). Of particular suspicion was the 
autocratic role being played by Baird herself, and the lack of confidence in her leadership of the 
RCNRT. Four fellow commissioners, including two of the most prominent feminist voices, attempted to 
take Baird to court to force her to share details of the gathered research. Id. at 114. After a public falling-
out, the dissenting commissioners were fired. 
104  Baird had already been under fire for other reasons during this time. She had taken particular 
heat from some members of the disability rights movement for an article she had co-authored in 1982, in 
which she discussed the benefit of extending the prenatal diagnosis program in British Columbia to 
detect Down Syndrome and neural tube defects in the unborn. Baird and her co-author maintained that 
the cost of providing prenatal diagnosis and abortion for defective fetuses was far lower than providing 
extra medical and social services for disabled individuals over their lifetimes. In a radio interview, she 
explained: “I can tell you in our prenatal diagnosis program in the last few years we’ve detected 62 
abnormal fetuses [she is referring to unborn babies with spinal bifida]. The parents have elected in every 
single case to terminate. So, that is 62 individuals who would have been seriously handicapped and a 
burden on the health-care system even if you figured they only lived on the average five years.” Donald 
DeMarco, Canada’s Commission on Reproduction, INTERIM: CAN.’S LIFE & FAM. NEWSPAPER (July 1, 
1990, 2:02 PM), http://www.theinterim.com/issues/canada%E2%80%99s-commission-on-reproduction/. 
For more on the subject please see the scholarly article in question, A. D. Sadovnick and P. A. Baird, A 
Cost-benefit Analysis of Prenatal Diagnosis for Neural Tube Defects Selectively Offered to Relatives of 
Index Cases, 12 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 63–73; as well as a scathing critique of the economic reckoning 
involved in Baird’s analysis, John P. Moore, The Tragic Mistreatment of Down Syndrome Babies, 
INTERIM: CAN.’S LIFE & FAM. NEWSPAPER (Jan. 29, 1995, 9:50 AM), http://www.theinterim.com/issues/ 
abortion/the-tragic-mistreatment-of-down-syndrome-babies/. 
105  Weir & Habib, supra note 633, at 149. They note: “The Royal Commission responded to the 
sites that feminists had constituted as politically sensitive, but failed to extend the critique into areas that 
had not been problematized or only weakly addressed by feminists. Thus, bioscience other than clinical 
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Commission had not been more transparent in its operations.106 
Still, the Commission concurred with many of the diverse points 
flagged by feminists as politically sensitive. There were multiple chapters 
devoted to the issue of infertility, including suggestions to focus money and 
research on preventing infertility and supporting maternal health.107 There 
were also recommendations to license only those clinics that conducted sex-
selection testing for medical reasons, and to ban court-ordered obstetrical 
interventions.108 All of these matters had been primary concerns of the 
feminist platform. 
Key among the recommendations made by Proceed with Care was a 
call for revisions to the Criminal Code in order to criminalize several 
aspects of new reproductive technologies. Of special concern was the sale 
of human reproductive material, including eggs and sperm, as well as 
actions taken by intermediaries to bring about a preconception arrangement, 
the receipt of payment or any financial or commercial benefit for acting as 
an intermediary, and/or making payment for a preconception 
arrangement.109 The report suggested that commissioning parents and any 
brokers be subject to criminal sanction, although the surrogate herself 
should not be penalized for participating in the arrangement. 
Under the terms of the report, these proscriptions were to be enforced 
by a newly created federal watchdog. The Commission encouraged the 
federal government to “establish a regulatory and licensing body—a 
National Reproductive Technologies Commission (NRTC)—with licensing 
required for the provision of new reproductive technologies.”110 The NRTC 
would be composed of at least 50% female members and charged with 
regulating the lawful use of assisted reproductive technologies. While the 
system of regulation was unclear, the aim was to ensure a uniform country-
 
medicine, genetics, the biotechnology industry and other forms of capital were left untouched by 
feminist perspectives.” 
106  Many of the women who had originally pushed for the Commission had criticized what they 
perceived as Commissioner Baird’s opaque dealings. Margrit Eichler, who had headed the original 
Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, was one of the 
Commission’s fiercest critics. “We are in the position of the horrified parents who find their child 
horrendously transformed,” she declared in 1993. Eichler, supra note 58, at 217. Eichler joined forces 
with other frustrated feminist leaders, including some who had been working inside the Commission, to 
publish an appraisal of the RCNRT even before the report’s release. Id. Some accounts of the internal 
workings of the Commission were published in the anthology MISCONCEPTIONS under anonymous 
pseudonyms due to a “gag-order” that had been imposed by Chairperson Baird. See Anonymous, in 
MISCONCEPTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHOICE AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE AND 
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES (Gwynne Basen et al. eds., 1993). They found that the conduct of the 
Commission and its staff, as well as its research and its evaluation of the issues, were largely deficient. 
107  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. at 1022. 
110  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at xxxii. 
05-MARVEL 4.24.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  6:24 PM 
106 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:81 
wide system. 
 
 MEDICALIZATION AND CRIMINALIZATION OF LESBIAN-ORGANIZED  
 DONOR INSEMINATION GROUPS 
 
While, as mentioned, the report did take up a concern with infertility 
funding and maternal health, the central role of medical professionals in 
providing NRTs was accepted as a given. Arguments for women’s 
autonomy and the ability to avoid medical gatekeeping through, for 
example, home self-insemination, had fallen to the wayside. Indeed, the 
kinds of feminist positions that were (and were not) able to find purchase 
within the RCNRT report are nicely illustrated by the treatment given to 
grassroots networks that had developed around access to donor sperm. One 
on hand, the report paid careful attention to the reproductive needs of 
lesbians in regard to donor insemination (“DI”), within a section that 
intoned: 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the practice 
evident in testimony before the Commission was the use of 
DI by single women and lesbians. . . . Many respondents 
were of the view that because DI gives women without a 
male partner the chance to have children, it devalues the 
role of males in relation to their children and deprives 
children of a father.111 
Yet despite the controversy posed by fatherless households, the report 
concluded that donor insemination should not be restricted only to 
heterosexuals but provided in a fair and equitable manner to all. Single 
women and lesbians should not be denied access to safe donor sperm, as 
they “essentially have the same diagnosis as married women—lack of a 
male partner who is fertile and a strong wish to have a child.”112 Equality 
principles, the Commission continued, therefore dictated that lesbians 
should not be barred from forming a family. While this may certainly 
appear a progressive stance, not least given the situation at the time in other 
countries,113 it was through increased medicalization and surveillance that 
such reproductive methods were to be made “safe”. Rather than, for 
example, recommending a strengthened support of the women’s networks 
that had already sprung up around teaching and access to donor sperm, the 
 
111  Id. at 430. 
112  Id. 
113  For example, Ingrid Lüttichau has outlined the fierce battles that racked the Danish national 
legislature in 1997, within the context of a relatively progressive Scandinavian state, over the lesbian use 
of donor insemination. Ingrid Luttichau, We Are Family: The Regulation of “Female-Only” 
Reproduction, 13 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 81 (2004). 
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Commission suggested the establishment of an Assisted Insemination Sub-
Committee with responsibility for licensing the collection, storage, 
distribution, and use of sperm in connection with assisted insemination.114 
The compulsory licensing requirements would apply to any individual 
or facility engaged in “the assisted insemination of a woman other than the 
social partner of the sperm donor.”115 According to this framework, known 
donors (such as a friend or intended co-parent) would be subject to the same 
rigorous and demanding regulatory regime as anonymous donor sperm. 
Under the mandate of keeping women “safe,” the RCNRT recommended 
that all licensed facilities ensure the screening of donors and testing of 
donor sperm for infectious diseases, “including a six-month quarantine on 
donated sperm to allow for human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) testing 
of donors.”116 Gay men had been referred to as frequent sperm donors for 
lesbian women in public hearings before the Commission, and the report’s 
specific reference to screening for the AIDS virus, and no other, may be 
read as a reaction to the fears of viral contamination understood as 
circulating within the gay community. 
This medicalization was further ensured by a suggested ban upon fresh 
sperm (“only frozen sperm from licensed storage and distribution facilities 
should be used”), a ban on sperm imports, and the suggestion that “a license 
is required to perform insemination at any site other than the vagina even if 
the recipient is the social partner.”117 The move to bring donor insemination 
within the ambit of medical licensing and treatment would not only mean 
that a lesbian could no longer inseminate her partner, it also drew lesbians 
into closer proximity to a culture of pharmaceuticals and hormones. These 
proscriptions, when taken together, meant that local women’s organizations, 
which had been developing expertise in sperm donation, access, 
insemination and storage, would no longer be able to provide lesbians 
access to fresh sperm. Nor would they be able to assist in procedures such 
as intra-uterine insemination and the deposit of sperm directly into the 
cervix. 
Thus, under the mantle of equality principles and the inclusion of 
liberal and lesbian feminist perspectives, the RCNRT laid the foundation 
for a system that assumed the HIV-positive status of gay donors and 
effectively shut down grassroots women’s organizations aimed at 
supporting lesbians and single women. At the same time, as described in 
more detail below, the criminal prohibitions that had been suggested by 
 
114  PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 65, at 1025. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. at 1026. 
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radical feminists found purchase in the report’s suggestions to revise the 
Criminal Code. The RCNRT recommended the application of criminal 
penalties to a range of actions such as the provision of compensation for 
donor sperm, egg donation, and surrogacy.118 Even as known donor sperm 
was brought under the wing of medical professionalization and quarantine, 
a criminal ban would be imposed upon payment to anonymous donors. That 
the likely effects of this twin regulatory mandate would be felt most deeply 
by those dependent on donor sperm to create their families––lesbians and 
single women––seems not to have occurred to the Commission. 
In general, the use of feminist language throughout the report was at 
best viewed as lacking a grounding in the social reality of women’s lives, 
and at worst seen as a willful appropriation of rhetoric that lacked 
underlying substance.119 Diana Majury accused the report of taking a 
“Polyanna approach to equality” wherein racism, sexism, oppression, and 
“lesbian hatred” are framed as matters of individual opinion rather than as 
systemic and institutionalized discrimination.120 Anne Burfoot argued that 
while a passing attempt at a range of opinions had been attempted, 
“important considerations of differences among women’s voices—
especially those who resist new reproductive technologies for various 
reasons—are lost in the Commission’s Report.”121 According to Burfoot, 
radical feminist voices had been decontextualized and removed from their 
political grounding, simultaneously appropriating the language of resistance 
and denying it an actual platform.122 
While the patriarchal critique had been stripped away, the residue of 
ban and prohibition remained in full, joined by a new protectionist language 
 
118  These effects were to be felt profoundly by gay men in the years to come. Such a framework 
has obliged (for example) gay male commissioning parents to seek out altruistic gestational surrogates 
and ova donors, or track down altruistic traditional surrogates who would agree to use their own eggs. 
Any payment that might be exchanged is thus driven underground, with the commissioning parents 
subject to severe criminal penalties for the provision of monetary compensation for reproductive labor. 
For more on the impact on gay men in particular, see: Listening to LGBTQ People on Assisted Human 
Reproduction: Access to Reproductive Material, Services and Facilities, supra note 2. 
119  Critiques in this vein came from diverse sources, including: Shannon E. Ash, The Royal 
Commission on NRTs: Less . . . in 1,200 Pages, KINESIS, Feb., 1994, at 4; Anonymous 1–6 & Louise 
Vandelac, The Baird Commission: From “Access” to “Reproductive Technologies” to the “Excesses” 
of Practitioners or the Art of Diversion and Relentless Pursuit, in MISCONCEPTIONS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF CHOICE AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES (Gwynne 
Basen et al. eds. 1993); Christine Massy & Judy Morrison, Women and NRTs: Beyond the Report, 
KINESIS, Feb., 1994, at 8–9; National Action Committee on the Status of Women (“NAC”), The 
Regulation of Reproductive Technology (Working Paper); Margrit Eichler, The Construction of 
Technologically-Mediated Families,  27 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 281–308 (1996). 
120  Diana Majury, Is Care Enough? Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies, 17 DALHOUSIE L.J. 279, 285 (1994). 
121  Burfoot, supra note 61, at 500. 
122  Id. 
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that took the guise of public health policy. These initial recommendations 
proposed by the RCNRT, and the logics of criminalization and increased 
medicalization which infused it, were to have a long-lasting effect upon the 
regulations which would eventually be promulgated. In the absence of a 
clear platform expressed by LGBTQ stakeholders, either through groups 
like EGALE or through NAC, the needs of non-heterosexual families 
wishing to have children were lost. Lesbians were ushered in on vague 
equality principles, while the needs of gay men, trans people, and bisexuals 
were not contemplated. Instead, the infertile heterosexual couple emerged 
as the exemplary service user of this new form of regulated, sanitized, 
economized, and engineered form of technological reproduction. 
 
 NEXT PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
It would, however, be some time until these recommendations found 
their way into law. Shortly after the report of the Royal Commission on 
New Reproductive Technologies was released, a federal election was 
called. The Liberal government of Jean Chretien, newly elected to office, 
shelved the report. He then directed Federal Minister of Health Diane 
Marleau to call for a voluntary moratorium on nine reproductive and 
genetic technologies and practices, including commercial surrogacy 
arrangements, the buying and selling of eggs, sperm and embryos, and egg 
donation in exchange for IVF services.123 This moratorium was touted as 
the first phase of a comprehensive federal response to the Commission 
report and proposed as an interim strategy until a permanent management 
regime could be implemented.124 It was widely unsuccessful and openly 
flouted.125 This was followed by an Advisory Committee on Reproductive 
and Genetic Technologies, convened in January 1996 in order to advise on 
compliance and track new developments.126 
Strict provisions against sperm donation were tabled by Parliament in 
early 1996, reflecting many of the concerns of HIV and “safety” the 
RCNRT had identified.127 Bill C-47 emerged in June of that year, following 
in the deep traces of the Baird Commission, suggesting a federal criminal 
 
123  Press Release, Health Canada, News Release 1995-57, Health Minister Calls for Moratorium 
on Applying Nine Reproductive Technologies and Practices in Humans (July 27, 1995). 
124  NANCY MILLER CHENIER & MARILYN PILON, LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY OF BILL C-47: 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES ACT (1997), at i. 
125  Penni Mitchell, New Reproductive Technology Bill Awaits Delivery, 1 NETWORK MAG.  CAN. 
WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK, Spring 1998, at 10. 
126  CHENIER & PILON, supra note 124, at ii. 
127  Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SOR/96-254, 
enacted under the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. c. F-27. 
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law power and imposing extremely steep penalties for violation.128 When 
the Bill was first introduced, some private fertility clinics balked at the 
proposed prohibitions and vowed to ignore them.129 Meanwhile women’s 
advocacy groups, who had been waiting nearly a decade for legislation, 
were disappointed at the lack of an overall education and management 
structure that would establish the conditions under which new tests and 
procedures could be introduced.130 In April 1997, the Canadian Parliament 
came to a close and a federal election was called. Bill C-47 died on the 
order paper and, despite Jean Chretien’s Liberal party winning another 
majority, a replacement bill would not be tabled until 2002. 
 
 CONTINUED STEPS TOWARD LEGISLATION 
 
Under the name An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and 
Related Research, a series of three nearly identical bills followed. All listed 
a range of activities and technologies that were to be prohibited, outlined 
regulations for those that were to be permitted, and defined the criminal 
sanctions against violators of the Act.131 New Reproductive Technologies 
were now to be known in Canada as techniques of Assisted Human 
Reproduction. 
Finally in 2004, eleven years after the RCNRT had submitted its 
report, the AHRA received Royal Assent and officially became Canadian 
law. Notably, the AHRA placed a dizzying criminal ban on payment for 
surrogacy or the purchase of gametes, with a maximum of penalty of 10 
years in prison and/or a $500,000 fine. Yet hardly had it gained passage 
when the Attorney General of Quebec submitted a constitutional question to 
the Quebec Court of Appeal challenging the validity of certain provisions of 
the AHRA.132 After a partial victory for Quebec in the Supreme Court of 
 
128  An Act Respecting Human Reproductive Technologies and Commercial Transactions 
Relating to Human Reproduction, 2nd Sess., 35th Parl. (1996) [hereinafter Bill C-47]. 
129  Mitchell, supra note 125, at 10. 
130  Id. 
131  Bill C-56, Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 1st Sess., 37th Parl. (2002); Bill C-13, An Act 
Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl. (2003); Bill C-6, 
An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl. (2003). 
132  In the matter of a Reference by the Government of Quebec pursuant to the Court of Appeal 
Reference Act, R.S.Q., c. R-23, concerning the constitutional validity of Sections 8 to 19, 40 to 53, 60, 
61 and 68 of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2; Att’y Gen. Quebec v. Att’y Gen. 
Canada, 2008 QCCA 1167.  Section 1 of the Quebec Court of Appeal Reference Act, R.S.Q., c. R-23, 
provides that “The Government may refer to the Court of Appeal, for hearing and consideration, any 
question which it deems expedient, and thereupon the court shall hear and consider the same.” Section 5 
of that Act further provides, “The court shall send to the Government for its information its opinion duly 
certified upon the questions so referred, giving its reasons in support thereof, in like manner as in the 
case of judgments rendered upon appeals brought before the said court.” Although a court’s response to 
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Canada,133 Parliament repealed the invalidated sections in June 2012 and 
amended the AHRA, while also abolishing the federal agency tasked with 
overseeing assisted human reproduction in Canada.134 As such, the federal 
role relating to ART has been reduced considerably, as has the need for 
administrative and regulatory enforcement. All activities that were deemed 
to pertain to provincial jurisdiction over healthcare must now be regulated 
by each province, although there is no legal requirement to do so. In the 
words of Angela Cameron and Vanessa Gruben, the decision has “left a 
legal vacuum to be filled only when and how each province and territory 
see fit.”135 This presents the real possibility of a heterogeneous landscape of 
regulation in which domestic reproductive tourism may become the 
norm.136 
 
 DISCUSSION 
 
As NRTs appeared on the horizon in the late 1970s and became a site 
of global feminist discussion and contention, the situation in Canada was no 
different. This article has tracked the broad and robust field of feminist 
debate in Canada during the 1980s and throughout the convening and 
impact of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. A 
tremendous diversity of voices existed both in Canada and abroad, and by 
no means were all of a radical feminist stripe, firmly against the 
commercialization of women’s bodies in any form.137 As a federal platform 
 
questions posed on a reference is considered to be an advisory opinion, many legal scholars have 
suggested that reference opinions are in fact treated as if they were binding judgments. See, for example, 
Gerald Rubin, The Nature, Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law, 6 
MCGILL L. J.  168, 168–90 (1959–60). 
133  Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, infra note 156. (Binnie, Fish, and Charron, 
JJ., concurring). 
134  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, S.C. 2012, c. 19.  Ss. 713–75 (Can.). Division 
56 of Part 4 amends the Assisted Human Reproduction Act to respond to the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act that was rendered in 2010, including by 
repealing the provisions that were found to be unconstitutional and abolishing the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Agency of Canada. 
135  Angela Cameron & Vanessa Gruben, Quebec’s Constitutional Challenge to the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act: Overlooking Women’s Reproductive Autonomy?, in FERTILE GROUND: 
EXPLORING REPRODUCTION IN CANADA 2 (Stephanie Paterson et al. eds., 2014). 
136  Raywat Deonandan & Tarun Rahman, Implications and Reflections on the 2010 Supreme 
Court Ruling on Canada’s AHR Act, 3 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 405, 406 (2011). 
137  Early forms of this counter-critique were of course raging, in Canada and abroad, through the 
“sex wars” which wracked second-wave feminism and called into question issues of women’s 
oppression, the patriarchy, and the role of sex and sexual pleasure. Emerging from an (in)famous 
conference on the subject, Carole Vance’s edited collection remains a touchstone of these fiery debates. 
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole Vance, ed., 1984). Within new veins 
of postmodernist scholarship specifically about the law, a Foucauldian analysis as applied to legal 
feminism was soon to emerge from the writing of Carol Smart and her important 1989 text. See CAROL 
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for women’s issues coalesced out of the Charter debates and into the 
discussion on NRTs, however, a remarkably consistent vision was to 
emerge. 
The brief written by the largest women’s group in the country, the 
National Action Committee on the Status of Women, did not address any 
issues specific to gay or lesbian families, despite the substantial presence of 
lesbians within its diverse membership. Miriam Smith has explained the 
tensions between lesbians and straight women in the feminist movement as 
rooted in the unwillingness of straight women to advocate for lesbian rights 
and jeopardize their political success on other matters.138 As she writes, 
“The fear that participants in the women’s movement would be branded as 
dykes played a major role in the early years of the women’s movement in 
Canada.”139 This is affirmed by Jeri Dawn Wine, a founder of the Canadian 
National Lesbian Forum, who maintains that “NAC avoided the split over 
lesbian participation that the National Organization for Women suffered in 
the United States only at the cost of a decade of silence on the part of 
Canadian lesbians.”140 
Instead, the diverse membership of NAC was dominated by a radical 
feminist position that called for prohibition over regulation in line with 
international groups such as FINRRAGE.141 Out of the fractious roil of 
feminist positions, it was the dystopian vision of reproductive exploitation 
that became refracted through a uniquely Canadian lens, producing a 
technosocial Handmaid’s Tale in which real-life ART posed an unqualified 
danger to women. However, as time passed, and women’s groups 
conducted research, wrote briefs, and interacted with government agencies, 
movements like NAC deepened their analyses and (in some cases) broke off 
into other groups. Canadian feminist author Heather Menzies said in 1992 
that she wished a thorough discussion on reproductive technologies had 
occurred within the women’s movement before the creation of the RCNRT, 
 
SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989). 
138  MIRIAM SMITH, LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN CANADA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
EQUALITY-SEEKING, 1971–1995 (1999). 
139  In the United States, the National Organization for Women was publically split over the 
issues of lesbian rights; in Canada, NAC was able to avoid this open division, although it did not place 
lesbian issues on the national agenda until 1985. Id. at 29. 
140  JILL VICKERS, PAULINE RANKIN & CHRISTINE APPELLE, POLITICS AS IF WOMEN MATTERED: 
A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ACTION COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 75 (1993). 
141  As Lorna Weir and Jasmin Habib explain, few feminist organizations in Canada had much 
expertise in the area of new reproductive technologies before the RCNRT, and they drew extensively 
upon the radical feminist position developed elsewhere: “The general understanding that preceded the 
Baird Commission was consonant with the international and largely radical feminist literature then 
extant that viewed reproductive medicine as a research agenda dominated by masculine gender 
interests.” Weir & Habib, supra note 63. Note that the RCNRT was often called the “Baird 
Commission” after the Chair of the Commission, Patricia Baird. 
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thereby allowing a more nuanced set of positions to emerge.142 
Questions of relevance to lesbians, such as low-tech options using 
donor sperm which had long been popular within the lesbian community, 
were not addressed by NAC, although some worry was expressed over the 
medicalization of grassroots networks by fertility professionals.143 Gay male 
reproduction and the potential for more equitable surrogacy contracts never 
emerged as a point for discussion, nor did the reproductive concerns of 
transgender people (although it may well be argued that such matters were 
not in circulation even among gay and lesbian circles at the time).144 
However, it is no exaggeration to say that the emphasis of the national 
women’s movement remained squarely on the dangers posed by IVF, 
commercial surrogacy and the sale of eggs, sperm, and embryos. This focus 
was to have a material impact on the reproductive lives of Canadians in the 
years to come, with exacerbated effect on LGBTQ people and communities. 
The framework laid out in the RCNRT report proved to be enormously 
influential on the multiple legislative drafts that worked their way through 
Parliament. When the AHRA finally passed into law it reflected the 
Commission’s original desire for a federal governing body to regulate and 
oversee issues related to reproductive technology. The AHRA selected 
some allowable activities for medical control and licensing (such as donor 
insemination, screening and access to gametes, and the manipulation of in 
vitro embryos) and imposed strict criminal prohibitions on others (focused 
on the commercialization of reproduction including payment for eggs, 
sperm, and any role in the arrangement of commercial surrogacy). While 
the RCNRT had rejected all forms of surrogacy as a potential harm to 
women, the AHRA did make allowance for altruistic surrogates who would 
be permitted to receive the reimbursement of expenses. However, the 
central distinction drawn by the report, between two categories of activities 
for which different approaches were recommended, precisely guided the 
AHRA’s distinction between prohibited activities and controlled 
activities.145 
At the nexus of public health policy, criminal law and family creation, 
the AHRA absorbed a set of ideas and influences from prominent feminist 
 
142  As she suggests, such discussion might have allowed tensions to be worked out in private, 
allowing a more unified feminist front to be presented to the Commission. This paper suggests that 
dominant voices nevertheless found legislative purchase in the sympathetic realms of medicalization and 
criminalization. Heather Menzies, Some Thoughts on Writing about Infertility, INFERTILITY 
AWARENESS, Jan.–Feb., 1992, at 1. 
143  Coffey, supra note 48. 
144  Perhaps unsurprisingly, EGALE’s submission to RCNRT was silent on the reproductive 
rights and concerns of transgender people. 
145  This point was also made by LeBel and Deschamps, JJ. See Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, 2010 S.C.C. 457, 547 (Can.). 
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voices. While a diverse range of ideological positions and recommendations 
came out of the feminist community at the time, it was a mixture of federal 
regulation, criminal prohibition, and medical oversight—stripped of the 
original patriarchal critique—that would shape both the RCNRT report and 
subsequent legislation. Feminists who demanded greater state funding for 
infertility, sharpened attention to local needs and community engagement, 
and an awareness of the limits of technological “progress” to shape our 
social futures did not find their concerns reflected in official policy. 
Instead, the AHRA adopted a protectionist and medicalized health 
approach, and catalogued a range of procedures and actions for fresh 
regulation. As nonmedical issues (such as access to sperm for lesbian 
women) became defined and treated as medical problems, they were newly 
constructed as forms of illness. The process of locating and diagnosing 
medical pathology requires that it be marked as deviance from a norm, 
affirming one set of bodies and conditions as “healthy” and designating 
others as in need of treatment. This is the case even when the “illness” 
diagnosed is access to sperm from a sexual partner. As described above, the 
mode of healthy normalcy that is produced in Western nations tends to 
represent the idealized modern citizen—white, heterosexual, middle-class, 
and sexually reproductive. 
Thus not only were the feminist-generated solutions adopted by the 
state marked by criminal and medical logics, but they reflected a limited 
vision of family life that remained firmly grounded in heterosexual 
reproduction. This was partially due to the limited input from LGBTQ 
groups at the time—as a stakeholder community which had not yet 
organized around questions of reproduction and access, LGBTQ 
organizations were unable to question the equivocation of criminalization 
and sanitization with the resources, labor, and strategies required to create 
their children—and indicative of the restricted voice of lesbian organizers 
within national women’s chapters at the time. It also reveals those forms of 
power most amenable to adoption within structures of medical and legal 
governance. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The barriers faced today in Canada for LGBTQ people seeking access 
to ART have been shaped by two related and intersecting histories: the 
resonance of radical feminist ideals with governing techniques disposed to 
criminalization and medicalization; and the simultaneous effacement of 
communitarian and grassroots perspectives that were developing in 
response to queer reproductive needs. As discussed, the resilience of early 
semen-sharing organizations relied upon by lesbian and single women to 
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gain access to donor sperm was, when viewed through the lens of the HIV 
crisis, seen by the state as a vulnerable network that rationalized the 
protectionist health policy that soon followed.146 By the same token, 
genuine concerns about racialized exploitation and women’s pregnant 
bodies that radical feminists put forward in the 1980s eventually found legal 
purchase as a carceral regime aimed at preventing all forms of gamete 
compensation and drastically restricting allowable expenses for surrogacy. 
These policies have unduly impacted LGBTQ people, among others, as a 
community uniquely reliant upon ART to make their families. 
The feminist history of ART regulation in Canada thereby offers us a 
fascinating look at how different ideological positions can manifest into 
advocacy stances and political goals. As I have sought to argue, this story is 
not just about the “true” feminist vision surfacing from within the fray and 
finding its way into law. Rather it provides a case study in the types of 
positions that most readily find their way into forms of power, and those 
modes of advocacy which become entrenched in law and policy. It also 
allows us to see those positions which do not get taken up, and what 
institutional responses are not provoked by feminist movements. I have 
grounded this analysis within a concern for the reproductive needs of 
LGBTQ communities, and lesbian and single women in particular, in 
tracing the ways in which this political history has shaped current 
possibilities for queer family in Canada. 
In the service of telling outsider stories and challenging the vision of 
the “natural” that courses through the RCNRT, the AHRA, and the 
Reference Case alike, this paper has traced an important chapter in 
Canadian legal history, when legislation was being developed around the 
regulation of reproductive technology. The lack of representation by 
LGBTQ people allowed for a dominant narrative of heterosexual family to 
emerge from the debates, with the role of the state framed as a medical 
caretaker on one hand, and an enforcer of the moral boundaries of 
reproduction on the other. The feminist voices and positions expressed 
 
146  This reference to “vulnerability” invokes a specific intellectual paradigm being developed at 
Emory University through a network called the Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative 
(“VHC”). Following a series of related conferences and workshops, the VHC was launched at an April 
2008 roundtable discussion featuring the work of Martha Albertson Fineman, Paedar Kirby, and Bryan 
S. Turner. The VHC currently operates as an institutional space for the investigation of vulnerability 
theory and its application to models of state support and legal protection that focus on the commonalities 
of the human condition. A growing body of scholarship is being produced through the lens of 
vulnerability theory. See Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New Perspective on the 
Employment At-Will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 276 (2013); Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008); 
Angela P. Harris, Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene, 6 WASH. & LEE. J. ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, & ENV’T 98, 105–06 (2014); Jessica Dixon Weaver, Beyond Child Welfare—Theories on 
Child Homelessness, 21 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 16, 19 (2014). 
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during the RCNRT were largely denuded of political context amidst the 
process of policy development, while the criminal power was embraced and 
pressed into service to underscore a broadly federal sweep.147 
Despite the passage of time, a vision of the “natural family” continues 
to dominate as a social and cultural ideal, and people seeking gametes, 
surrogates, and reproductive assistance are still viewed as an exception to 
the “normal” system of biological reproduction. A reproductive justice 
understanding of queer uses of ART allows us to avoid privileging 
reproduction as either the site of bodily empowerment, or as an inherently 
exploitative relation built upon female oppression.148 It would also 
challenge the utility of a criminal regime as the primary response to the 
exchange of human reproductive materials and reproductive labor, and 
explore a range of regulatory options beyond the carceral. Such a position 
allows for more complex readings of commodification, exploitation, 
embodiment, and resistance to emerge. 
My retelling has also sought to shed light upon the relationship 
between advocacy, law, medicine, and power that can be instructive for 
those committed to promoting reproductive justice today. What emerges 
here is less a picture of conscious exclusion of lesbians and single women, 
than a case study of how techniques of power operate through the 
normalizing forces of medicine and law, and in collusion with feminist 
voices aimed ostensibly at emancipation and liberation. This insight helps 
us to pose contemporary questions of reproductive justice apart from the 
language of bare discrimination, and allows us to ask what forms of 
vulnerability are being exacerbated by family law and health policy models 
that continue to presume a singular, idealized mode of family creation and 
preservation. Such a project, I believe, helps us learn from the past even as 
we seek to bring questions of queer reproductive justice squarely into the 
present. 
 
147  Allison Harvison Young and Angela Wasunna have pointed out that such a “command 
model” is attractive for politicians because, irrespective of effectiveness, such laws are easily touted as 
concrete evidence of action. However, they remain deeply skeptical of the top-down approach, 
criticizing it as resting upon too ill-fashioned a regulatory instrument, and crudely wedged within the 
constitutional division of powers without regard for social realities or cultural diversities. Alison 
Harvison Young & Angela Wasunna, Wrestling with the Limits of the Law: Regulating New 
Reproductive Technologies, 6 HEALTH L.J. 239–42 (1998). The strategy of rooting prohibitions within 
the powers of criminal law also, of course, was a strategy to allow for the assertion of a federal 
jurisdiction. 
148  Of course, many same-sex couples may seek state validation as “just like” a “normal family” 
and therefore as equally deserving of legal recognition. The operation of power is multidimensional and 
not reducible to a singular narrative. As Brenda Cossman has argued, through processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, queer lives under the law are simultaneously “both normative and transgressive.” See Brenda 
Cossman, Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 40 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 223, 225 (2002). 
